Abstract This paper studies endogenous mergers of complements with mixed bundling, by allowing both for joint and separate consumption. After merger, partner firms decrease the price of the bundled system. In addition, when markets for individual components are sufficiently important, partner firms find it strategically advantageous to raise the prices of stand-alone products, thus making substitute 'mix-and-match' composite products less attractive to consumers. Even though these effects favor the profitability of mergers, merging is not always an equilibrium outcome. The reason is that outsiders respond by cutting their prices to retain their market share, and mergers can be unprofitable when competition is intense. From a welfare analysis, we observe that the number of mergers that are observed in equilibrium may be either excessive (when markets for individual components are important) or suboptimal (when markets for individual components are less important).
Introduction
Consumers are often interested in final goods that are obtained by combining complementary (compatible) products into systems or bundles, which may be substitutes for one another. A merger involving complementary products can have the beneficial effect of reducing a vertical negative externality ('double marginalization') since the price of the bundle falls below the prices that the firms would choose if acting independently. However, in oligopoly markets, merged firms may exercise market power through bundling, and this may be a means to foreclose rivals and/or relax price competition. Non-horizontal mergers of this type raise antitrust concerns since the net welfare effect is unclear. This paper addresses the incentives for mergers and the welfare implications in markets with complementary products; the merged firms can engage in bundling and rivalry from competing differentiated systems is considered.
Firms that offer a bundle of complementary products may practice mixed bundling: They set the price for the bundle as well as for the individual components, which may be used to form alternative 'mix-and-match' systems. Although separate consumption is present in this pricing policy, much of the recent literature has assumed that (complementary) components are valuable only when used together. Consumers purchase computer software and hardware components, cold and pain-relief medications, printers and ink cartridges, cellular telephones and SIM cards, ATM services and credit cards, local and connecting flights, train and bus services to get to work, contract services with telephone network operators (fixed and mobile lines, Internet, etc.), transportation and hotel services, etc. In addition to being bundled, these goods are also available to consumers if sold separately in the market place. Accounting both for joint and separate consumption allows us to study endogenous merger formation in a realistic setting where the issue of competition between bundles can arise.
We set up a simple four-firm model, where there are two firms that produce separate versions of a certain product ( A 1 and A 2 ) and two other firms that produce separate versions of a complementary product (B 1 and B 2 ). Consequently, four different competing systems of complementary products, which are partially substitutable, can be formed. We further assume that the firms have monopoly power in the markets for the individual components. A two-stage game is solved where merging decisions are made before firms compete in prices. Three market structures are analyzed: independent ownership, single integration (one merger is formed), and parallel integration (two mergers are formed).
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. In case of merger, partners have an additional strategic variable: the price of the bundle. By appropriately choosing the prices of the bundle and of the separate components, mixed bundling permits the merged firms to better exploit the diversity of consumer preferences. After merger, partners decrease the price of the bundle. In addition, when markets for individual components are sufficiently important, partners find it strategically advantageous to raise prices of stand-alone products thus making substitute 'mix-and-match' systems less attractive. Even though these effects favor the profitability of mergers, merging is not always an equilibrium outcome. The reason is that outsiders respond by cutting their prices to retain their market share, and mergers can be unprofitable when
